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DIRTY DANCING:
ATTRIBUTING THE MORAL RIGHT OF
ATTRIBUTION TO AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW:
THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE AND
THE USURPING OF THE ULTIMATE GRAND
DAME AND FOUNDER OF MODERN DANCE,
MARTHA GRAHAMt
INTRODUCTION

Martha Graham is an icon of modem artistry.' Her glamorous presence and intriguing movements 2 were of mythic stature even up until her
death in 1991 at age ninety-six. At her death she left behind 181 works
and a classroom technique that is still taught all over the world.3 Even
though her audience grew exceptionally over the thirty years she ran her
dance school and company, Graham's dance company, her sole proprietorship and labor of love, was often short of funding. In 1948, she incor-

t A different version of this Note was recognized as the winner of the Law Student Initiative writing
competition, sponsored by the Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section of the New York State
Bar Association. In the Summer of 2004, the winning piece was published in Volume 15, Number 2
of the Entertainment,Arts and Sports Law Journal, a publication of the Entertainment, Arts and
Sports Law Section of the New York State Bar Association.
1. In 1979, The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts placed Martha Graham in
the distinguished Kennedy Center Honoree category in its annual ceremony. The John F. Kennedy
Center for the Performing Arts, The Kennedy Center Honors, at http://www.kennedycenter.org/programs/specialevents/honors/history/home. In 1998, Time Magazine anointed Martha
Graham as the most influential dancer of the twentieth century in its "Time 100" series. Terry
Teachout, Time 100: Artists and Entertainersof the Century, TIME MAGAZINE, June 8, 1998, at 200.
See also Dance World Loses a Pioneer, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 2, 1991, at AOl (comparing Graham's early work to Picasso's art and Stravinsky's music).
2. When Margot Fonteyn first witnessed the Martha Graham Company perform, she remarked to Martha how differently the Graham Company's dancers fell than the Royal Ballet dancers. MARTHA GRAHAM, BLOOD MEMORY 253 (1991). Fonteyn said, "Why, we fall like paper bags.
You fall like silk." Id. In her memoirs, Graham wrote that "[M]y dancers never fall to simply fall.
They fall to rise." Id.
3. Judith Mackrell, Looking after Martha, After 20 years, the Martha Graham Dance Company is back in London but at a Cost, THE GUARDIAN, May 25, 1999, at 10.
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porated the Martha Graham Foundation for Contemporary Dance4 and in
1956, Graham formed her sole proprietorship into a nonprofit, and
named it the Martha Graham School of Contemporary Dance, Inc. ("the
School").5 The Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance ("the
Center") operated as an umbrella organization and oversaw the School
and 6the Dance Company; the Center and the School operated as one entity.
After a staggeringly incredible and much lauded fifty years on the
stage, in her seventy-fifth year, Graham reluctantly agreed to stop dancing.7 In the wake of her decision, one of her friends advised her to think
of herself not as a goddess but as a mortal. Graham replied, "That's difficult when you see yourself as a goddess and behave like one." 8 Subsequently she was hospitalized for a physical breakdown. 9 Ronald Protas, a
close friend and confidant, dedicated himself to caring for her during this
time.' 0 When she regained her health, Protas helped her reorganize her
company.'" Indeed, although his early background was in photography,
Graham trained him in her technique, and convinced him to discontinue
seeking a law degree in order to help her run the company. 12 He worked
closely with her during the final twenty-two years of her life and began
serving as the company's
General Director and Associate Artistic Direc3
tor in the late 1970's.'
As Graham grew frail over the years, afflicted by arthritis, poor eye
sight and failed hearing, Protas became "to a great extent her eyes, her
ears and her public voice." 1 4 Even though he was not a dancer, Graham
chose her close companion of over a quarter century to be the Artistic
Director of the Center and School. 15 In 1988, in a signed, notarized
4. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
5. Id. See discussion of nonprofits, infra at 342.
6. Martha Graham, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
7. See Laura Shapiro, After the Ball is Over: Is Martha Graham, 96, Being Done a Disservice by her Handpicked Successor?,NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 1990, at 70
8. Martha Duffy, The Deity of Modern Dance, Martha Graham. 1894-1991, TIME
MAGAZINE, Apr. 15, 1991, at 69.

9. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 71.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Karen Campbell, Here in Spirit: Ronald Protas Carrieson the Tradition, Grace and Substance of Martha Graham, THE BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 16, 1996, at 029.
13. Susan Reiter, Graham Co.: Can Troupe Carry On?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 3, 1991,
at Fl.
14. In 1990, Protas told NEWSWEEK that he was "sorry people feel [he is] overprotective, but
[he did not] think Miss Graham feels [that way]." Shapiro, supra note 7, at 71.
15. Clive Barnes, Is This Crisis Critical?, DANCE MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 2001, at 162.
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statement, Graham specified to both the structure and future of her company and school: "It will be for Ron Protas... to make the final artistic
decision as to the rightness of things artistically for my company and
school." 16 Shortly before her death, she told Protas something to the effect of, "[i]f things don't work out, not to worry. I'll settle for the legend."' 17 Protas understood that Graham knew that he was "so steadfastly
devoted to her that if things did fall below a certain standard, [he would]
stop it all in the blink of an eye."' 8 In her last will, executed on January
9
19, 1989, Graham named Protas as her sole executor and legatee.'
In May of 2000, the Center suspended operations because of financial troubles. 20 That same year, Protas' relationship with the Board of
Directors ("the Board") became strained, prompting the Board to vote to
remove him from its ranks. 2 1 The primary cause for the discord may
have been his non-dance background.2 2 However, it is undisputed that
preserving his inheritance from Martha Graham has been Protas' life
work; even his critics "credit him for helping to keep Graham alive and
steering the company.through financial trauma., 23 As Graham's legal
heir, once removed from the Center, Protas disallowed the Graham company to either use her name or perform her repertory.24 In July of 2000,
he applied to register copyright in forty of Graham's25 choreographic
works and secured registration for thirty of those works.
16. Reiter, supra note 13, at F1.
17. Campbell, supra note 12, at 029. In her memoirs, Martha Graham recounts collaborating
with American Ballet Theatre ("ABT"), when Mikhail Baryshnikov was the head of the organization. GRAHAM, supra note 2, at 247-49. She recounts that Baryshnikov and she agreed that should
ABT perform some of her company's dances they "would be monitored, and would be coached
properly." Id. She goes on to say that other companies asked her to do "absolutely impossible"
things, such as wanting to have one of her ballets and wanting "to be able to perform it within two
weeks," which were refused because she became upset when "the technique [was] taught badly." Id.
She viewed "technique as a science" and her memoirs make it clear that she was very exacting in
whom she trusted to carry on her legacy. Id.
18. Campbell, supranote 12, at 029.
19. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
20. See Jennifer Dunning, Martha Graham Center Wins Rights to the Dances, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at B7.
21. See Tresca Weinstein, Body Language Troupe Sets the Stage in the Martha Graham Traditionfor Visit to The Egg, THE TIMES UNION, Sept. 11, 2003, at 22.
22. See Susan Kraft, Love Is Not Enough, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 23, 1997 (on file with
authors) (observing that a layman, such as Protas, can not think about dancing in the same way that
a dancer can).
23. Mackrell, supra note 3, at 10.
24. See Sylviane Gold, Modern Phoenix, NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 2003, at D19.
25. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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The Center balked at Protas' copyright application and in January
2001, Protas commenced an action in the Southern District of New York
against the Center and the School. He sought a declaration of copyright
ownership in the ballets choreographed by Graham during her lifetime
and that he owned the costumes and sets used in connection with those
ballets.2 6 Protas based his claims on his status as both legatee under Graham's will and as trustee of the Martha Graham Trust, "a revocable trust
of which he is the creator, trustee, and sole beneficiary. 2 7 In August
2002, the Southern District of New York held against Protas, and ruled
that the Center owned most of the dances in question, per the work for
hire doctrines of both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts. 28 Most recently, in August 2004, the Second Circuit affirmed.2 9
With its decision to award ownership of Martha Graham's dances
to the nonprofit, the Southern District and the Second Circuit implicitly
ignored the principle of moral rights,30 which has governed this type of
situation in European civil law countries for many decades. Moral rights
protect a creator's personal integrity in her work from being interfered
with by others.
This Note argues that the moral right of attribution, (the right to
have one's name attached to one's work) which is in direct conflict with
the work for hire doctrine, must be applied to the narrow circumstances
in which the posterity of the work of a founder of a nonprofit, created
solely to further her own artistic vision, is in question. Such an application warrants a critical look at the theory behind the work for hire doctrine in relation to American copyright law. Ultimately, as this Note posits, applying the moral right of attribution to the work for hire doctrine in
such narrow circumstances is not a radical proposition. Indeed, a ruling
by the Ninth Circuit in 2000 indicates that a shift toward recognizing the
fundamental rights of creator-founders of nonprofits is a move this country might be willing to make.31

26.
27.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Reply Brief at 6, Martha Graham, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567.
Martha Graham,224 F. Supp. 2d at 570.

28. See id. at 567.
29. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cit. 2004).
30. The word "moral" used in this context does not have a direct translation to the modem
English meaning of the word.
31.

See Self-Realization Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322 (9th

Cir. 2000).
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THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT
IMPERILED MARTHA GRAHAM'S LEGACY WHEN BOTH COURTS
MISAPPLIED THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINES OF THE COPYRIGHT ACTS
OF 1909 AND 1976

Congress derives the right to enact copyright legislation from the
United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. 32 The purpose of federal copyright legislation is to give "the owner of copyrighted materials the exclusive right to
reproduce a copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or transfer of ownership or by rental, lease or lending, to
perform the copyrighted
work publicly, or to display the copyrighted
33
work publicly.
The Courts Misappliedthe "Instance and Expense" Test of the
Work for Hire Doctrineof the Copyright Act of 1909
Although the work for hire doctrine was first codified in the Copyright Act of 1909,34 the common law courts had already fleshed out the
doctrine prior to congressional initiative. 35 Six years before the codification of the 1909 Act, the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for the
36
work for hire doctrine in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co,
where it ruled that "where an employee creates something as part of his
duties under his employment, the thing created is the property of the
employer." 37 The work for hire doctrine arose from the common law rationale that when one employs another to produce a creative work, that
work properly belongs to the employer.38 The presumption implicit in
this rationale is that the work is not entirely the product of the employee's creativity, because the employer supplied the initial idea and
8.
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
33.

ScHs. LEGAL SERV. ORANGE COUNTY DEP'T OF EDUC., COPYRIGHT 1 (2002).

34. The Copyright Act of 1909 is applicable to works created and published before January 1,
1978. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976).
35. See, e.g., Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (D. Mass. 1900); Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25
F. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); Roberts v. Myers, 20 F. Cas. 898 (D. Mass. 1860).
36. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
37. Brown v. Molle Co., 20 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239).
38. Scott K. Zesch, Annotation, Application of "Works for Hire" Doctrine Under Copyright
Act of 1976, 132 A.L.R. FED. 301 (1996).
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motivation for the project and the means for executing it. The work for
hire doctrine provides an efficient, bright-line rule that easily enables
courts to resolve conflicts in an employer-employee situation. The 1909
Act added little to the then existing common law work for hire doctrine. 39 The Act made the employer the "author" and initial copyright
holder of "works made for hire, 4 ° but failed to define both "employer,"
and "work for hire." The legislative history of the Act does not provide
any insight into these omissions.4'
In 1966, the Second Circuit considered the 1909 Act's work for hire
42
doctrine in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.
The Brattleboro court set forth the "instance and expense" test. The
opinion stated that the works made for hire doctrine was "applicable
whenever an employee's work is produced at the instance and expense
of his employer. In such circumstances, the employer has been presumed
to have the copyright. ' '43 Several years later, in 1972, the Second Circuit
held in Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc. that "an essential element of
the employer-employee relationship, [is] the right of the employer 'to
direct and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his
work."' 44 In 1974, the Second Circuit stressed, in Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc, that the "instance and expense test" is met
"when the motivating factor
in producing the work was the employer
45
who induced the creation.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit applied the work for hire doctrine
of the 1909 Act in Self-Realization Church v. Ananda Church of SelfRealization.46 The issue in Self-Realization was whether the written
works of a monk who lived in a nonprofit church that he founded in order to teach and share his religious vision could be considered works for
39.
MICH. L.
40.
41.

Matthew R. Harris, Note, Copyright, Computer Software and Work Made for Hire, 89
REv. 661,670 (1990).
Id.
But see CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT, MEMORANDUM DRAFT OF A BILL TO AMEND AND

CONSOLIDATE THE ACTS RESPECTING COPYRIGHT 13 (1906), reprintedin Legislation History of the

Copyright Act of 1909 pt. E, at xxxix-xxx (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 1976). It is notable that
an early draft of the bill included employers within the definition of "author" in the case of a work
produced by an employee during the hours for which his salary is paid, subject to any agreement to
the contrary." Id.
42. 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966). This case adopted the Ninth Circuit's holding in Lin-Brook
Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965) (reasoning under the Copyright Act
of 1909 that "the copyright shall be in the person at whose instance and expense the work is done").
43. Brattleboro,369 F.2d at 567.
44. 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
45. 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974).
46. 206 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 2000).
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hire under the 1909 Act. 47 The monk, Yogananda, founded SelfRealization Fellowship Church ("SRF"), and while living there wrote
various books and articles and delivered religious lectures. 48 SRF obtained copyrights to most of Yogananda's published books in its own
name, classifying them as works for hire.4 9
A decade after Yogananda's death, James Walters, a member of the
church, left SRF to form Ananda, "a rival church dedicated to the teachings of Yogananda. ' ' 50 Ananda copied some of the copyrighted books,
and SRF filed an infringement action. 5 ' SRF based its claim on the work
for hire doctrine, and while Ananda admitted having published the
works, it argued that the original church's copyrights were not valid
since the works were not made for hire. 2 The court decided in favor of
Ananda.5 3 In acknowledging the Second Circuit's definition of the instance and expense test as reasoned in Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Dumas,54 the Ninth Circuit unambiguously declared that there was no demonstrative evidence that it was at SRF's instance "that Yogananda
decided to write, teach, and lecture., 55 The court firmly stated that
Yogananda's "own desire" perpetuated his creations, and because those
works were "motivated by [his own] desire for self-expression" they
could not be considered to be works for hire.56 The court relied on
precedent in its description of the rationale underlying the work for hire
doctrine, qualifying it as a presumption that "the parties expected the
employer to own the copyright., 57 Because SRF's relationship with
Yogananda apparently did not involve such a presumption, and even
more importantly because "there was no evidence of supervision or control of Yogananda's work by SRF," the court decided that the works in
question were patently not works for hire.58 The courts that heard the
Martha Graham case should have used the same cogent reasoning.
In August 2002, Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum of the Southern District of New York wrote a lengthy opinion in which she essen47. Id. at 1324.
48. Id. at 1325.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.at 1326.
53. Id.
54. 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995).
55. Self-Realization Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th
Cir. 2000).
56. Id.
57. May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1980).
58. Self-Realization, 206 F.3d at 1327.
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tially attempted to answer the question, "What property did Martha Graham, the great dancer, choreographer, and teacher, own at the time of her
death in 1991?",59 The court focused on the thirty-five year period (between 1956 and 1991) that the Center and the School operated as a combined entity.60 The court held that the nonprofits proved ownership in
forty-five of the seventy dances in question. 6 1 In addition, the court held
that Protas proved ownership in just one dance.62 The court concluded
that ten of the dances 63 in question are in the public domain, which essentially means that they may be legally performed by anyone, and that
in regard to five commissioned dances (two published and three unpublished),64 neither side had proven that the commissioning party intended
for Graham to reserve the copyright. 65 Lastly, the court held that neither
side had proven that the remaining nine published dances 66 were published with the required statutory copyright notice.67
The court evaluated the dances separately. The dances created before January 1, 1978 are governed by the Copyright Act of 1909, and the
dances created after that effective date are governed by the Copyright
Act of 1976.68 In interpreting the 1909 Act, the Southern District invoked the "instance and expense" test developed by Brattleboro and its

59. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (S.D.N.Y 2002).
60. Id. at 570. Dances that Martha Graham created before the founding of the Center and the
School were not the subject of this litigation.
61. Id. The nonprofits were given copyright ownership of Tanagra, Three Gopi Maidens,
Harlequinade,Primitive Mysteries, Serenade, Satyric Festival Song, Dream, Saraband,Imperial
Gesture, Deep Song, Every Soul is a Circus, El Penitente, Letter to the World, Punch and the Judy,
Salem Shore, Deaths and Entrances, Eye of Anguish, Ardent Song, Embattled Garden, Episodes:
Part I, Acrobats of God, Phaedra, Secular Games, Legend of Judith, The Witch of Endor, Part
Real-Part Dream, Cortege of Eagles, Plain of Prayer, Mendicants of Evening, Jacob's Ladder,
Lucifer, The Scarlet Letter, 0 Thou Desire Who Art About to Sing, Shadows, The Owl and the
Pussycat, Ecuatorial,Frescoes, Judith (created in 1980), Andromache's Lament, Phaedra's Dream,
Song, Tangled Night, Persephone, Maple LeafRag, and The Eyes of the Goddess. Id. at 612.
62. Protas was given ownership of Seraphic Dialogue. Id. at 612.
63. Id. at 612-13. The ten dances found to be in the public domain include Flute of Krishna,
Heretic, Lamentation, Celebration, Frontier,Panorama, Chronicle/Steps in the Street, American
Document, Appalachian Spring, and Night Journey.Id.
64. These five dances are Herodiade, Dark Meadow, Cave of the Heart, Judith, and Canticle
for Innocent Comedians. Id. at 613.
65. Id.at 570.
66. These nine dances are Errand into the Maze, Diversion of Angels, Clytemnestra, Circe,
Adorations, Acts of Light, The Rite of Spring, Temptations of The Mood, and Night Chant. Id. at
613.
67. Id. at 570.
68. !d. at 587.
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progeny, and the court held that Graham's dances were indeed created at
the instance and expense of the Center.69
The court held that the expense prong of the test had been met because available .audit reports revealed that the combined account of the
School and Center paid Graham salaries and also because a reading of
both the Center's Annual Report and payroll records tended to show that
Graham was a full-time employee. 70 The court stated further that the
Center paid Graham's personal and medical expenses, although this
point is not explained or elaborated upon in the decision. 71 The court
also stated that because it happened that some of the Center's employees, namely other principal dancers, occasionally aided Graham in her
creative process, the dances were thus created at the expense of the Center.72 Finally, the court rejected Protas' argument that Graham cannot be
considered to have been an employee because of her receipt of royalties
from the Center and School for her ballets, by holding that there was not
enough credible evidence of royalty payments made to Graham by the
Center.
While the court's application of the expense prong is questionable,
the Southern District's blatant misapplication of the instance prong of
the Brattleboro test renders the entire test incorrect. While the court conceded that "Martha Graham was ultimately responsible for making all
final artistic decisions relating to the dances," it nevertheless strangely
held that the instance prong of the Brattleboro test had been satisfied.74
The court argued, unpersuasively, that even though the Board had not
interfered with her artistic decisions, the "board would try to assist her in
her choreographic endeavors," and "made suggestions of an artistic nature to her," and thus contributed to the creative process. 75 The court's
decision that the instance prong had been met is decisively incorrect. In
fact, Graham completely dominated the Board of Directors of her nonprofit. 76 And although the Board made suggestions and offered assis69. Id. at 587-91. See Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995); Elec. Publ'g Co.
v. Zalytron Tube Corp., 376 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1967); Irving J. Dorfman Co. v. Borlan Indus. Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
70. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 588-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
71. Id. at 589.
72. Id.
73. Id. For this point, Protas relied on Playboy, which held that "where the creator of a work
receives royalties as payment, that method of payment generally weighs against finding a work-forhire relationship." Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555.
74. Martha Graham,224 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
75. Id.
76. See Transcript 726-28, Martha Graham,224 F. Supp. 2d 567.
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tance, "she alone decided what projects to undertake and when and
where she would work.",77 The Board's offers of assistance were simply
a natural consequence of its dependence on Graham as the lifeblood of
the entire organization. Judge Cedarbaum's opinion is at its weakest
when it attempts to make these instance-related points; evidence that
could establish that Martha Graham was a mere hired hand of the nonprofit she founded is just too scarce to be relied upon.
The Second Circuit erroneously affirmed the district court's decision because as a matter of law, under the 1909 Act, the instance prong
of the work for hire doctrine was not fulfilled. Should Protas appeal to
the Supreme Court for certiorari,our nation's highest court would be
wise to follow the cogent and appropriate reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
in Self-Realization Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization.
As was the case in Self-Realization Church, Graham's dances were
motivated by her own "desire for self-expression," and thus cannot be
deemed works for hire. The paradigm present in Self-Realization Church
is exactly the same as that in Martha Graham: an artistic creator founded
a nonprofit to promote and spread her own creative vision. The creator
then died and a dispute arose regarding the ownership of copyrighted
works governed by the 1909 Act. The nonprofit claimed ownership
based on the work for hire doctrine. The Southern District and the Second Circuit should have adopted the Ninth Circuit's logical reasoning.
The Center did not play a substantive role in the creation of Martha Graham's dances. Graham was already an accomplished choreographer before the nonprofit was founded, and her reputation made the Center possible and then successful. It is hard to imagine a scenario in which a
creator could establish a successful nonprofit without already having established a reputation for herself in a certain artistic field. The compensation she received could hardly be called an adequate exchange for her
unprecedented dances. Further, Graham created the dances independently, without direct supervision from anyone at the Center.
To follow the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Self Realization Church
is to be logically consistent with the rationale behind the work for hire
doctrine. The reason that the United States espouses the work for hire
doctrine is because it provides a bright line rule as to who owns a copyright to work in situations where an employer contributes substantially to
an individual's creation through the terms and conditions set forth for

77. Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief at 15, Martha Graham, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567.
78. 206 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 2000).
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her employment. Martha Graham was clearly not on the employee side
of that bright-line rule.
The Courts ErroneouslyEvaluated the Aymes Factorsof the
Work ForHire Doctrine of the CopyrightAct of 1976
In 1955, a movement to reform copyright law commenced.79 In its
effort to rewrite the Act, Congress faced the formidable challenge of replacing a statute that covered a difficult, technical area, one in which the
lawmaking body had little expertise. This problem was somewhat alleviated by the legislature's decision to turn to authors, publishers, and artists for assistance. 80 The Copyright Act of 1976 is the product of Congress' effort to completely rewrite copyright law,8 ' so as to enhance the
"predictability and certainty of copyright ownership." 82 The works for
83
hire provisions were included in this all-embracing revision.
The 1976 Act specified that works created after January 1, 1978,
are governed by the Copyright Act of 1976,84 and if a copyrightable
work is made for hire, the employer or commissioner is considered the
author and thus owns the copyright.8 5 Under the 1976 Act, a work is
considered made for hire if(1) it is prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment, or (2) is prepared by an independent
contractor and falls within one of the varieties of specially ordered or
commissioned works identified in the statute, under the proviso that the
parties expressly agree in writing that the work is made for hire. 86 Accordingly, there are two different ways through which a work made for
hire can develop: one involving employees, and the other involving in-

79. H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659,
5660.
80. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (1987).
81. See Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989) ("The Act,
which almost completely revised existing copyright law, was the product of two decades of negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-using industries, supervised by the Copyright Office and, to a lesser extent, by Congress."); Litman, supra note 80, at 859.
82. Alexandra Duran, Note, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: The Supreme
Court Reduces Predictabilityby Attributing an Agency Standardto the Work for Hire Doctrine of
the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1990) (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 749).
83. For works made for hire, the duration of the copyright is 95 years from the publication of
the work, or 120 years from its creation, whichever is shorter. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
84. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-702 (2000).
85.

17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).

86. Id. § 101.
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dependent contractors. 87 The Copyright Act of 1976 altered the doctrine
as it was interpreted under the 1909 Act by specifying that only nine
types of commissioned works 88 qualify as works for hire, and then only
if the parties have agreed in writing to designate a work as such.89
Because the legislative history behind the revisions was not significantly enlightening in terms of Congress' intent regarding the work for
hire provisions, the courts were once again confronted with the task of
interpreting the modifications. 90 The application of the work for hire
doctrine first involves an inquiry as to the status of the party who prepared the work in question. 9 t Because the 1976 Act does not define the
92
terms "employee" or "scope of employment" in its definition section,
the Supreme Court was forced to resolve 93this glaring omission in Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid.
In late 1985, the Community for Creative Non-Violence
("CCNV"), a Washington D.C. nonprofit organization committed to
eradicating homelessness, and one of its trustees, entered into a verbal
contract with James Earl Reid, a local sculptor, for a sculpture to be featured in the annual Christmas Pageant of Peace in Washington, D.C.
CCNV had elected to participate in the event "by sponsoring a display to
dramatize the plight of the homeless., 94 The nonprofit visualized a
sculpture of a modem nativity scene in which the traditionally Caucasian, Christian holy family was to be replaced by an African-American
family, where "the two adult figures and the infant would appear as contemporary homeless people huddled on a street-side, steam grate.,

95

In

addition, CCNV specified that the figures were to be life-sized and that
the steam grate would be set on top of a platform base, "within which
special-effects equipment would be enclosed to emit simulated 'steam'
through the grid to swirl about the figures. 96 Finally, CCNV indicated
that the title of the work was to be "Third World America," and that the
inscription on the base was to read "and still there is no room at the
87. Id. § 101(2).
88. The nine types of commissioned works include a contribution to a collective work, part of
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, a translation, a supplementary work, a compilation, an
instructional text, a test, answer materials for a test, and an atlas. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "work made for hire").
90. See Litman, supra note 80, at 901. "Indeed, because the work made for hire definition was
part of a settled compromise package, it received little mention." Id.
91. See, e.g., Zesch, supra note 38, at 311.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
93. 490 U.S. 730, 738-41 (1989).
94. Id. at 733.
95. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.C. 1987).
96. Id.
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inn.",97 Reid agreed to sculpt the three human figures, while CCNV
agreed to construct both the steam grate and the base for the sculpture.98
The parties did not sign a written agreement and did not discuss copyright for the work. 99
Reid worked exclusively on the statue throughout November and
half of December in 1985, and was assisted periodically by several people who were paid in installments by CCNV.'0 0 On December 24, 1985,
Reid delivered the completed sculpture to the CCNV premises in Washington, D.C., and was paid the final installment. 10 1 "Third World America" remained on display for one month, and in late January of 1986 it
was returned to Reid's studio for minor repairs. 10 2 A few weeks later
CCNV planned a tour of several cities to raise money for the homeless
and requested that Reid return the statue so that it could be the centerpiece of the nonprofit's initiative. 0 3 Reid objected on the ground that the
casting material "was not strong enough to withstand the ambitious itinerary.' 0 4 In March 1986, CCNV again asked Reid to return the sculpture and Reid again refused.'0 5
Reid subsequently filed a certificate of copyright registration in his
name and proclaimed that he planned to take "Third World America" on
a "more modest" tour than the one that CCNV had intended. 10 6 CCNV
trustee Mitch Snyder, acting on behalf of the nonprofit, filed a competing certificate of copyright registration. 10 7 In addition, Snyder and
CCNV commenced an action in federal district court seeking return of
the sculpture and a determination of copyright ownership. 0 8 The district
court declared that "Third World America" was a work made for hire
under section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976, and that CCNV exclusively owned the copyright in the sculpture.10 9 The district court reasoned that Reid was CCNV's employee within the meaning of section
101(1) of the Copyright Act, and because CCNV was "the motivating

97. Id.
98. Reid, 490 U.S. at 733.
99. Id. at 734.
100.

Id.

101.
102.

Id. at 735.
Id.

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105.

Id.

106. Id.
107.

Id.

108. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.C. 1987).
109. Id. at 1457.
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factor" in the statue's production." 0 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded, holding that "Third World
America" was not a work for hire."' The Court of Appeals concluded, in
agreement with the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society for Crippled
Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises,'12 that
"the 1976 Act has greatly restricted the scope of the 'work for hire' doctrine," and that a literal interpretation of the 1976 Act is the most appropriate method of explication. 1 3 In applying a literal interpretation, the
court held that Reid was an independent contractor and not an employee
of CCNV, and that "Third World America" did not fall within a category
Act. 114
of commissioned work enumerated in section 101(2) of the 1976
Thus, Reid owned the copyright in the sculpture.
The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the courts of appeals over the proper construction of the 'work made for
hire' provisions of the [1976 Act].""' 5 In Reid, the Supreme Court provided working definitions for the terms "employee" and "scope of employment."' 16 The Court resolved the disagreement among the circuit
courts by firmly adopting the view that these terms should be construed
in light of the general common law of agency," 17 concluding that Congress had intended to encompass the "conventional master-servant relationship." 1 8 The Court set forth several factors that may be considered
when determining whether someone is to be considered an employee." 19
No single factor is determinative, and it is not necessary for the factors

110. Id. at 1456.
111. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
112. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
113. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1487.
114. Id. at 1494.
115. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 (1989).
116. Id. at 739-42.
117. See also Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992); Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled
Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1987); Moore Publ'g, Inc.
v. Big Sky Mktg., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Idaho 1999); City of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp.
3d (D.N.J. 1995); Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).
118. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740.
119. Id. at 751-52. These factors include the hiring party's right to control the manner and the
means by which the product is accomplished, the skill required for execution, the source of the instrumentalities and tools, the location of the work, the duration of the relationship between the parties, whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party, the extent
of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work, the method of payment, the hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants, whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party, whether the hiring party is in the business, the provision of employee benefits, and the
tax treatment of the hired party. Id.
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to be given equal weight. 2Indeed, in some cases, some of the factors will
be completely irrelevant. 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision reached by the court of
appeals that Reid was not an employee of CCNV, but rather an independent contractor. 12 1 The Court conceded that "CCNV members directed enough of Reid's work to ensure that he produced a sculpture that
met their specifications,"'' 22 but stated that the extent of control a hiring
party exercises over the particulars of a work is not dispositive. 123 The
Court pointed out in its opinion that "all the other circumstances weigh
heavily against finding an employment relationship."' 124 Specifically,
Reid procured his own tools and performed the work in his own studio
in Baltimore, where supervision of his activities by CCNV operatives in
Washington was "practically impossible."' 125 Further, Reid was retained
for roughly six weeks, a rather short amount of time, and throughout this
time and afterwards, CCNV had no right to allocate additional projects
to him. 126 In fact, except for the deadline set by CCNV for finishing
"Third World America," "Reid had absolute freedom to decide when
and how to work.' 27 Additionally, Reid was paid a fixed amount contingent on the satisfactory completion of the statue, and he had absolute
discretion in his selection of assistants. 28 Finally, the Court reasoned,
"CCNV did not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or workers'
compensation funds.' ' 129 30Accordingly, the Court concluded, Reid was an
independent contractor.
120. In Aymes, the Second Circuit noted that "the Reid test can be easily misapplied, since it
consists merely of a list of possible considerations that may or may not be relevant in a given case."
Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. Accordingly, the court stressed that only a few of the Reid factors will be
"significant in virtually every situation." Id. The court classified those important factors as "the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of creation, the skill required, the provision of
employee benefits, the tax treatment of the hired party, and whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party." Id.
121. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 752-53.
127. Id. at 753.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. In remanding the authorship issue to the district court, the Supreme Court made clear that
if the court determined that "CCNV and Reid prepared the work 'with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,"' then CCNV and
Reid would be co-owners of the copyright in the work. Reid, 480 U.S. at 753 (citing 17 U.S.C. §
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In the Martha Graham case, the Second Circuit should have reversed the district court's ruling because the Southern District did not
accurately apply the body of law pertaining to the 1976 Act. The district
court concluded that the dances created after the effective date of the
1976 Act were, within the meaning of the Act, prepared by Graham
within the scope of her employment. 131 In its application of Reid, the
Southern District laid out the balancing test for determining whether an
employment relationship exists.1 32 While it acknowledged all thirteen of
the traditional Reid factors to be considered in applying the balancing
test, 33 the district 'court stressed that those factors "should not merely be
tallied but should be weighted according to their significance in the
case."' 134 Indeed, the district court applied only the five factors deemed to
35
be the most significant by the Second Circuit in Aymes v. Bonelli.
However, the Southern District misapplied three of the five Aymes
prongs. Therefore, Graham cannot be considered an employee of the
Center.
First, the court misapplied the prong that examines the hiring
party's right to control the manner and means of creation. Under this
prong, the court incorrectly dismissed the fact that Graham possessed all
artistic control of her work. The court unconvincingly argues that simply
because the Board did not actually exercise its right to control the creation of Graham's dances does not mean that the Board did not still possess such a right.1 36 However, the court overlooks the fact that the Board
never had the right to control the creation of Graham's work.
Second, the Aymes factor that examines whether the hiring party
has the right to assign additional projects is also unfulfilled in this case.
As discussed supra, the Board made mere suggestions from time to time,
but never under any circumstances was it allowed to instruct Graham on
how to create and perform. 137 The right to control prong and the right to
assign additional projects prong, analyzed together, are reminiscent of
the instance prong under the 1909 Act, which, as discussed supra, the
court misapplied.
101 (2000)).
131. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc., v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

132. Id.
133. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
134. Martha Graham, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861-62
(2d Cir. 1992)).

135.

980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992). See supra note 120.

136.
137.

Martha Graham, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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The third Aymes factor that the court misapplied is the skills factor.
Graham's talent is undeniable; her place in history is legendary.138 Her
skills as a choreographer and dancer are arguably unparalleled. 3 9 If the
140
Supreme Court in Reid found that sculpting is a "skilled occupation,"'
in its analysis of a local, relatively unknown artist, then there can be no
question that under governing law, Graham's occupation is a skilled one
as well. Instead of looking to the Supreme Court's interpretation for
guidance, the district court characterized Graham as a "senior employee"
of the Center, one whose "high level of skill in choreography" does not
render her of the "project-oriented status" associated with independent
contractors. 4 1 The basis for the court's lackluster qualification of Graham as a mere hired hand, albeit a "senior" one, is preposterous.
Due to the court's misapplication of three of the five Aymes factors
under the 1976 Act, the Second Circuit should have reversed the Southern District's decision and held that Graham's repertoire cannot be considered a collection of works made for hire. Under both the 1909 Act
and the 1976 Act, it is obvious that Graham was not an employee of the
Center and thus the work for hire doctrine is inapplicable. The following
section of this Note will illustrate how Graham, as a creator-founder of a
nonprofit organization, cannot be considered an employee of her organization.
CREATOR-FOUNDERS OF NONPROFITS SHOULD NEVER

BE

CONSIDERED

EMPLOYEES OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONS

Martha Graham's School and Center, as well as most of the nation's artistic and cultural activity, are a part of American economic society known as the nonprofit sector. 142 Nonprofits have long been a major driving force behind American culture, and represent our society's43
belief that individuals can improve the lives of those around them.
This belief exists because nonprofits, unlike any other type of American

138.

See suprapages 326-327.

139. Id.
140.
141.
142.

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989).
Martha Graham, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
MICHAEL O'NEILL, NONPROFIT NATION: A NEW LOOK AT THE THIRD AMERICA 151

(2002). "According to the IRS... there were 23,779 nonprofit arts, culture, and humanities organizations circa 1998, with $19.4 billion in revenue, $15.2 billion in expenses, and $46.5 billion in total
assets...." Id. at 153. See id. at 11, Table 1.2.
143. LESTER M. SALAMON, THE RESILIENT SECTOR 1-2 (2003).
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"dedicated to mobilizing private initiative for the cominstitution, are
144
mon good."'
The United States government does not play a major role in the
country's arts and culture scene. In contrast, many governments in other
developed countries, such as France, Germany and Sweden, are extremely involved in their arts and culture scenes. 14 5 However, Congress
and state legislatures do recognize that certain types of organizations
benefit communities and society as a whole, but are not profitable
enough to support themselves financially. 146 Per this recognition, the
government acknowledges that these enterprises ought to be exempt
from the burden of income taxes shouldered by other types of businesses.147 It is generally recognized that society ought to support and
foster these organizations in return for the societal benefits they provide. 1 Tax exemptions lift the financial burden of nonprofits considerably because most cannot financially support their operations.' 49 Tax
since donations
advantages are vital to the survival of arts. nonprofits,
150
and grants are their single largest source of income.
In particular, arts nonprofits provide vehicles for expression that
"enrich human existence"' 15' by providing our social and cultural communities with dynamic forums for healthy debate and the articulation of
diverse sentiments. One leading civic and community behavioral expert
pointed out that art is invaluable in "transcending conventional social
barriers.... ' ',52 In addition, art in America has a significant economic impact on society, an assertion strengthened, for example, by a 1999 study
conducted by the National Endowment for the Arts that concluded that
consumers spent $10.2 billion on admission to performing arts events, as

Id.
145. O'NEILL, supra note 142, at 151; see also id. at 157, Table 8.4 (listing income sources of
selected arts nonprofits).
146. Id.at151.
147. The Nonprofit Resource Center, What is a Nonprofit Corporation?,at http://www.not-forprofit.org/page2.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
148. Id. See also SALAMON, supra note 143, at 8. The largest category of nonprofit organizations are those eligible for exemption from federal income tax under §501(c) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and the "closely related 'social welfare organizations' eligible for exemptions under
§501(c) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code." Id. There is no definitive number of nonprofit organizations in the United States, but "[a] conservative estimate would put the number of... §501(c) (3) &
(c) (4) at 1.2 million as of the mid-1990s...." Id.
149. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (2003).
150. O'NEILL, supra note 142, at 20, Table 1.4.
151. Id.at 13.
152. Id.at 159.
144.
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to spectator sports, and $7.4
compared with $8.2 billion on admission
153
billion on admission to motion pictures.
While a nonprofit cannot have an owner, it can have a board of
trustees and often an executive director. 154 In the case of an artistic nonprofit, if there is a person whose artistic vision drove the founding of the
the executive dicorporation and drives its agenda, she is often named
55
rector, since she is likely to be "uniquely qualified."'
In fact as well as in theory, [the founder] serve[s] at the pleasure of the
Board of Directors and [is] subject to a contract. In practice, however,
[her] job security come[s] from [her] status as the single entrepreneur.
Without [her], the organization fails (or at least suffers tremendous arcrises). [The founder is] the organization's single
tistic and financial
156
largest asset.
Artists found nonprofits so that they can continue to create artworks, execute them for the public, and teach their techniques to others.
If creator-founders are considered mere hired hands of these infant nonprofits, then the founding of the organization becomes adversarial and
the nonprofit's benefits to society are threatened. Further, from a public
policy standpoint, society can only stand to benefit from exposure to
creator-founders' reputable teachings and works. To qualify such an artist as a hired hand of the nonprofit is to effectively punish her for having
a vision. If willing and able, creator-founders of nonprofits should presumptively always be deemed the executive directors of their nonprofits.
As this Note will continue to illustrate, creator-founders should
never be treated as employees. The theory of moral rights, and specifically the right of attribution, provides further credence for this argument.

153.

NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, RESEARCH DIVISION NOTE NO. 77, "The Arts in the

GDP: Consumers Spend $10.2 Billion on Admission Receipts for Performing Arts Events in 1999"
(Washington D.C. 2001).
154. Bruce R. Hopkins, Bruce R. Hopkins Nonprofit Law Center, Resource Center: Basic
Concepts, at http://www.nonprofitlawcenter.com/resources.jsp?docld=137 (last visited Oct. 31,
2003).
155. Michael L. Wyland, Sumption & Wyland, Can the Founder of an OrganizationAlso be
an Employee?, Internet Nonprofit Center, at http://www.nonprofits.org/npofaq/19/43.htm (Sept. 8,

2003).
156.

Id.
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THE UNITED STATES SHOULD EXTEND VARA's MORAL RIGHTS
PROTECTION TO PERFORMING ARTISTS

The theory of moral rights, originating from the French term "droit

moral," arises from the European concept that an artist's creation is the
direct product of, and therefore part of, her personality. 157 Moral rights
158
protect the creator's personal and spiritual expressions in her work.
Moral rights allow the law to recognize a creator's inherent rights in
works of art, revealing a societal belief that artists ought to have a level
of control over their creations not enjoyed by creators of other types of
personal property, because of the perceived connection between an artist
and her artwork. 159 This perceived connection caused European civil law
countries, most notably France, 160 to historically recognize the personal

interests of a creator in her work separately from her copyright interests.16 1

The Berne Convention for the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the "Berne Convention"), 162 originally drafted in 1886, codified the notion of an artist's separate personal
interest in artwork by requiring that signatory countries provide protection for artists' moral rights. 163 The Berne Convention currently has
more than 90 members. 64 Article 6b provides for the limited moral

157. Colleen Creamer Fielkow, Clashing Rights Under United States Copyright Law: Harmonizing an Employer's Economic Right with the Artist-Employee's Moral Rights in a Work Madefor
Hire, 7 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 218, 221 (1997).
158. Id.
159. Russ VerSteeg, FederalMoral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis,
67 WASH. L. REV. 827, 828-29 (1992).
160. See Russel J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists'
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOc'y U.S.A. 1, 7 (1980). The
French droit d'auteurprotects both the artist's monetary rights and her moral right. Id. at 3. Moral
rights attach to a creative work under French law if the creator is a natural person and is the actual
creator of the work. Id. at 12.
161. Alicia M. Phidd, Law Office of Phidd & Associates, Entertainment Law: Moral Rights &
Fair Use - Striking a Balance, at http://phiddlawfirm.tripod.com/phiddassociates/id4.html (Sept.
2001). Even the United Kingdom, from which the United States inherited its common law tradition
and copyright law, revised its copyright law to include express moral rights for artists. Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 12(l) (Eng.).
162. See The Berne Convention for the International Union for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, reprintedin Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical andArtistic Property,and the Protectionof Ideas, 27-2 (1996).
163. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors'andArtists' Moral Rights: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 96 (1997).
164. See Benjamin S. Hayes, Note, IntegratingMoral Rights into US. Law and the Problem of
the Works for Hire Doctrine,61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1022 (2000).
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rights of attribution and integrity.165 The Berne Convention was an attempt to provide a "broad provision for moral rights recognition" and a
move towards a uniform international body
of law with respect to the
1 66
rights of authors in the works they create.
A creator's right of attribution entitles her to either attach her name
to her work, or not to attach her name to her work (anonymity), as well
as to the right to publish or display her work under a pseudonym or
anonymously. 167 The right of integrity gives the creator the right to protect the physical integrity of her work, namely the right to prevent alteration, distortion or mutilation, or any other derogatory action which affects the work and results in prejudice to the creator's honor or
reputation. 168 The concept embodied by the Berne Convention that a
creator's moral and economic rights in a work are separate, manifests
itself in the artist's right to retain moral rights in a work even after transferring the economic rights to another person.69
The United States finally joined the Berne Convention in 1988 with
the passage of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
("BCIA"), 170 and formally adopted its provisions in 1990 with its passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA").'7 1 VARA amends the
Copyright Act,172 and was the result of a long, hard-fought Congressional campaign.1 73 The United States was reluctant to join the Berne
Convention because moral rights are inconsistent with the United States'
and United Kingdom's common law view that copyright is a part of
property rights, as opposed to the view of European civil law countries
that copyright is part of a creator's human rights. 174 Congress, as well as
165. Id. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1985). Other generally recognized moral rights not

included in the Berne Convention include the right of disclosure, the right of withdrawal, and droite
de suite. See Hayes, supra note 164, at 1019-22.

166. Fielkow, supra note 158, at 221.
167. Id. at 222-23, 223 n.20.
168. Id. at 223.
169. See the Berne Convention, supra note 162, at 26-27, art. 6b.
170. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
171. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128, 5128-33 (1990).
The terms of the Berne Convention are not self-executing; thus it is the responsibility of the member
country to execute its terms through its own legal system. Phidd, supra note 161.
172. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
173. Charles Ossola, Lawfor Art's Sake, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 27.
174. William Belanger, U.S. Compliance With the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L.
REV. 373, 385-87. It is thought that it may be unconstitutional for the United States to fully comply
with all of the Berne Convention's provisions. Id. at 385-87. The U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8,
cl. 8, grants Congress the right to secure for authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their crea-
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the courts, however, have been, and continue
to be, extremely reluctant
75
to expand artists' rights under VARA. 1
In fact, VARA only represents Congress' compromise between protecting the rights of attribution and integrity, and protecting copyright
interests. 76 After the ratification of the Berne Convention in 1935,
"Congressional support quickly vanished upon realizing that copyright
laws would have to be changed to accommodate the inclusion of moral
rights., 177 The United78 States almost always places economic. interests
before artists' rights.

VARA affords considerably less protection to American artists than
the Berne Convention does to European artists. 179 This is mostly the result of strong political concerns voiced by those who opposed the intro80
duction of the moral rights concept into American copyright law.'
VARA only protects two of the different facets of European moral

tions, but only for a limited time. Id. at 390 n.138. Some argue that Congress is permitted to provide
this limited monopoly right as an incentive for the creation of artworks that are made available to
the public. Id. Full compliance with the Bere Convention would expand the monopoly beyond that
necessary to promote the dissemination of art works. Id. For further discussion, see generally
Hayes, supra note 164, at 1024-27.
175. There have only been three cases in which a court construed the provisions of VARA. See
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a work may
not be distorted, mutilated or modified under VARA, if the work is proven to be of recognized stature by satisfaction of a two pronged test); Moncada v. Rubin-Spangle Gallery, Inc., 835 F. Supp.
747, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (showing that dispute over destruction of a wall mural settled before the
merits of the claim were addressed); Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Prods., Inc., No. 92-C-1055, US
Dist. LEXIS 10156, at *11-12 (N.D. I11.
July 13, 1992) (holding that plaintiffs' contributions to a
puppet show were not protected works under VARA). None of these cases is instructive in a situation like that of Martha Graham's work.
176. See Edward J. Damich, A Comparison of State and FederalMoral Rights Protection:Are
Artists Better OffAfter VARA?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 953, 955 (1993).
177. Cheryl Swack, SafeguardingArtistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage:A Comparison
of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 382
(1998).
178. See id. at 381-82 (explaining the origin of the United States preference of economic efficiency over artists' rights). See also Dasilva, supra note 160, at 6 ("[N]o matter how diligently a
state may try to protect moral rights, the failure of the federal copyright law even to address the issue creates a national standard of indifference toward artists' rights," and puts copyright above artists' rights.). "By ignoring moral rights, federal law creates a fundamentally 'amoral' copyright." Id.
at 6.
179. Many European groups have protested the United States' failure to fully comply with the
terms of the Bere Convention agreement. European Commission, Intellectual Property: EU and
US at Odds over Authors' Moral Rights, EUROPEAN REPORT: BRUSSELS, Sept. 14, 1996, Vol. 14,
Iss. 2157. One main criticism of the Berne Convention is its failure "to provide [the] legal means to
compel a state failing to respect the provisions contained in the Convention." Id.
180. See VerSteeg, supra note 159, at 830-31 (describing the legislative process leading to the
United States accession to the Berne Convention).
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rights, those of integrity and attribution.' 8 ' The artist is only afforded
these rights for the duration of her life, 182 whereas under French law, a
creator's moral rights in her creations are perpetual, and can be bequeathed upon the creator's death.183 Article 6b of the Berne Convention
requires that moral rights in a work continue for the same length of time
as the economic copyright. 84 VARA does not provide the rights of anonymity and pseudonymity afforded by the Berne
Convention, "nor does
85
it provide the right of faithful reproduction."'
VARA arbitrarily distinguishes between similarly situated artists,
protecting only those who happen to create the "right kind" of visual
art. 186 In addition, VARA only protects specific types of visual art,187
whereas Article 6b of the Berne Convention protects all literary and artistic works. 188 In fact, the Congressional debate surrounding the passage
of VARA reveals that there was "a consensus that the bill's scope should
be limited to certain carefully defined types of works and artists," and
that this limitation was considered by lawmakers to be the "'critical underpinning of the limited scope of the [Act]."" 8 9 The final version of the
Act "was a negotiated solution that confines the application of moral
rights to a narrow class of works in which copyright industries have little
interest. ' 19° Thus, although VARA purports to protect artists' rights, it
181. Hansmann, supra note 163, at 97.
182. See Matthew A. Goodin, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Further Defining the
Rights and Duties of Artists and Real Property Owners, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567, 569
(1992).
183. DaSilva, supranote 160, at 14.
184. Dana L. Burton, Note, Artists' Moral Rights: Controversy and the Visual Artists' Rights
Act, 48 SMU L. REv. 639, 642-43 (1995). It is uncertain whether VARA will preempt state laws
that extend the moral right of an artist past the time of death. See Ossola, supra note 173, at 27.
185. Belanger, supra note 174, at 375.
186. In one of the few cases interpreting VARA, the Second Circuit noted that "Congress instructed courts to 'use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic community in
determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of the definition [of a 'work of visual
art'],' and explicitly stated that 'whether a particular work falls within the definition should not depend on the medium or materials used."' Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting H.R. Rep. 101-514, 101st Cong., reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6915, 6921).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). "A work of visual art does not include - (A) (i) any poster, map,
globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual
work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication...." Id.
188. Damich, supra note 176, at 947. Fielkow, supra note 158, at 225. VARA also provides
that moral rights are not transferable, although they may be waived by the creator, and that the duration of moral rights is limited to the life of the creator. Id.
189. Pollara,344 F.3d at 269 (citing H.R. Rep. 101-514, 101st Cong., reprinted in 1990 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 6915, 6919).
190. Ossola, supra note 173, at 27.
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only protects a narrow niche of artists engaged in the creation of visual
works.1 91 The exclusion of dance works (e.g., choreography) is inconsistent with Congress' alleged reasoning behind the exclusion, namely
to
92
cover only unique works, not works that are commonly reproduced.
Most importantly, for the purposes of this Note, VARA explicitly
excludes any works made for hire. 193 Moral rights in a work made for
hire do not exist for either party under VARA."' 194 Allowing an artist to
retain moral rights in ballet choreography, surely a unique creation,
would not interfere with the constitutional objective of American copyright law, namely, toensure "public availability of a broad array of intellectual and artistic works."' 95 Indeed, the restrictive scope of VARA is
illogical and troubling.
The classification of an artist as an employee becomes vitally important to the life and spirit of both the artist and her art. Choreography96
is a unique art medium that cannot necessarily be expressed on paper.1
A dance, made up of a long series of complicated and intricate steps, can
only be accurately performed, one might argue, by the choreographer
herself, or alternatively by someone who is carefully trained in her
method. Martha Graham's dances were legally copyrighted by way of a
sequence of notations on paper, 197 but the copyright was truly on the sequence of dance moves as she herself danced, saw, and taught them. Performing art should be considered visual art under VARA, and the courts
should abandon the statute's arbitrary distinctions. To separate these renowned dances from an artistic genius such as Martha Graham is to
leave her artistically destitute and violates her most basic moral rights in
her masterpieces.
This Note proposes that the inconsistency between VARA and the
stated purpose of the Berne Convention (the moral rights doctrine) can
be resolved through a series of synchronized steps that harmonize the
191.

See Hayes, supra note 164, at 1023.

192. Michael R. Klipper & John B. Glicksman, Berne Measure Doesn't Incorporate New
Moral Rights into U.S. Law, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 24, 1990, at 19.

193. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). "A work of visual art does not include -... (B) any work made for
hire; or (C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title." Id.
194. Fielkow, supra note 157, at 233.
195. Burton, supra note 184, at 656.
196. See generally Kathleen Abitabile & Jeanette Picerno, Dance and the Choreographer'sDilemma: A Legal and CulturalPerspective on Copyright Protectionfor Choreographic Works, 27
CAMPBELL L. REv. 39 (2004).
197. But see Kraft, supra note 22 (stating that "choreography is notoriously difficult to pre-

serve" and that "[n]ot even the best efforts, combining notation with visuals and employing the filter
of a writer's selective memory and point of view, bring a work to life as forcefully as direct communication from body to body.").
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moral right of attribution with the work for hire doctrine, specifically for
creator-founders of nonprofits. The first step, as discussed supra, must
be the exclusion of creator-founders of nonprofits from the work for hire
doctrine, making a non-issue of the fact that full application of the affirmative right of attribution squarely conflicts with the work for hire
doctrine.
The second step must be the expansion of VARA to include art
forms beyond "visual art," namely performing arts. The purpose of
copyright law, to strike a balance between artists' rights and the public's
need to access creative works, will not be weakened by this expansion.
This Note posits that of all performing art, choreography is the most
misunderstood and underestimated because, although it is highly complicated, it tends to look effortless and undisciplined when executed,
unlike more mainstream types of visual art, such as film or painting. If
Congress were to initiate such an expansion, creator-founders of nonprofits, like Martha Graham, would have the opportunity to take advantage of VARA's moral right provisions. This narrow subset of artists
would be protected from the usurping of their legacy. This is not a radical proposition.
This Note does not suggest that VARA be re-promulgated. While
we are dismayed by its lackluster subscription to the Berne Convention
and by its minimal usefulness to artists, it is unrealistic to expect a major
overhaul of a concededly progressive piece of American legislation. Instead, this Note proposes to work with what Congress has passed. In
light of America's priorization of economic rights over human rights,
one author proposes that full application of the right of attribution can be
construed as an economic right.1 98 From this point of view, ascribing the
moral right of attribution to the creator-founders of nonprofits seems
even less radical of a proposition for America's law to recognize. Either
the United States should withdraw from the Berne Convention, because
its support of the organization is completely paltry, and therefore embarrassing, or the legislature should bring the United States into full compliance with the terms of the Berne Convention by giving artists moral
rights in their work and expanding the coverage of VARA to include the
performing arts.
Had the Southern District of New York correctly applied the instance and expense test as well as the Aymes factors correctly to Martha

198. Hayes, supra note 164, at 1027 (arguing that applying the right of attribution to the work
for hire doctrine "would tend to give employee-authors greater recognition in their field, and greater
bargaining power over the terms of their employment.").
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Graham's works after the inception of the Center, then the logical result
would have been that her dances were not works made for hire at all, but
rather dances written and taught and performed by her at the very Center
that she herself specifically founded for such purposes. Graham would
then have had the right, under section 201 of the Copyright Act,' 99 to bequeath her copyrights in her dances to Ronald.Protas. Although Protas
could allow the Center to use these dances if he wished, he could not assert any moral rights to the dances because VARA does not extend to
any moral rights in an artistic work past the life of the artist. However, if
the United States had fully complied with all of the terms of the Berne
Convention, specifically giving artists perpetual moral rights in their
works, then Martha Graham's ownership of her dances could rightfully
have passed to her protfg6 Protas. In turn, through Graham's transferred
moral right, Protas could assert control over the dances.
CONCLUSION

It is a fundamental truth of human nature that people desire acknowledgement of their accomplishments. The practical manifestation of
this axiom is that no one should receive recognition for work that is not
one's own. These corollaries provide the backbone for the theory behind
American copyright law, as well as for the moral right of attribution.
While in language these two theories are in direct conflict, in practice
they can be properly distinguished without great disruption to our legal
system. Specifically, because the work for hire doctrine should be inapplicable to creator-founders of nonprofits, the moral right of attribution
should be freely applicable to this narrow subset of people. Creators of
nonprofits such as Martha Graham utilize the nonprofit form in order to
relieve themselves of tax burdens that ordinarily would inhibit them
from creating their art. To apply the work for hire doctrine to this group
is to ironically thrust this burden back upon these creators by forcing
them to treat the nonprofit as an adversary even before its birth. The
Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit erroneously applied the work for hire doctrines of the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976
in the Martha Graham case. Should Protas appeal to the Supreme Court,
our nation's highest judges would do well to re-evaluate American copyright law, especially as the work for hire doctrine, an integral component
of American employment law, continues to evolve.
199.

17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1) (2000).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss1/9

26

Kutner and Rich: Dirty Dancing: Attributing the Moral Right of Attribution to Amer

2004]

DIRTY DANCING

Sarah Kutner" and Holly Rich***

** I would like to thank my co-author and friend, Holly Rich, for her tireless work on our Note, and
for her spirited encouragement when I wanted to throw in the towel. Thanks also to the Journal
staff, who diligently helped to edit this Note, and to our advisor, Professor Grant Hayden, whose
insightful critiques made us work so much harder. And thanks to my family, friends and Mike, who
put up with the many moods that came with writing this Note.
*** Thank you to my co-author, Sarah, for her friendship and patience. I would also like to thank
Professor Grant Hayden, for his humor and insight. Many thanks to Elissa Hecker, whose encouragement to undertake this project helped it to succeed, and to Judith Prowda, for her inspiration and
gusto. I also wish to thank Matthew Mehnert for his keen editing of this piece. And to the Hofstra
Labor & Employment Law Journal, it has been a pleasure to serve as your Editor-in-Chief, and I
thank you for your hard work on this Note. Thanks to my darling sister, Emily, for showing me the
true meaning of grace. I'd like to dedicate this Note to my fabulous parents, Steve and Barbara
Rich, for their unwavering belief in me.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

27

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 9

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss1/9

28

